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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Antonio Pearson is a prisoner who suffered from two 
serious medical needs during his incarceration at 
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution–Somerset (“SCI-
Somerset”). In 2009, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
claiming that various prison officials and an independent 
medical contractor were deliberately indifferent to those 
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In this appeal, 
Pearson challenges the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the five defendants remaining 
in this case. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 
the District Court’s order, in part, insofar as it grants 
summary judgment in favor of Nurse David Rhodes. We will, 
however, affirm the District Court’s order in all other 
respects. 
I 
A 
In April 2007, medical officials at SCI-Somerset sent 
Pearson to the hospital twice within the same week to 
undergo surgery. The first was a surgery to remove his 
appendix. The second was a surgery to repair a urethral tear 
caused by the insertion of a catheter during the first surgery. 
The defendants are five individuals who were either aware of 
or responded to Pearson’s requests for medical treatment 
before those surgeries. Dr. McGrath is a medical contractor 
who examined Pearson when he complained of bleeding after 
his first surgery. The other four defendants are Department of 
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Corrections employees, including three nurses who examined 
Pearson, and a guard who was informed of Pearson’s 
bleeding on the morning of his second surgery. 
Events Leading to Surgery for Appendicitis 
On April 10, 2007, Pearson began experiencing sharp 
pains in his abdomen and requested an appointment with the 
medical unit. At 1:00 p.m., Nurse Denise Thomas examined 
Pearson and noted that his pain intensified with certain 
movements and never fully relieved. Diagnosing him with a 
pulled muscle, she placed him on sick call for the following 
day without ordering additional treatment. 
Pearson’s excruciating pain continued and he returned 
to medical at 5:00 p.m. This time, Nurse Linda Kline 
examined him, offered Tylenol or Maalox, and instructed him 
to rest until his sick-call appointment in the morning. 
According to Pearson, she told him that his gallbladder was 
failing. 
At approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, Pearson told 
the block officer that he was in severe pain and asked him to 
call the medical unit. After speaking with the medical unit, 
the officer returned to Pearson’s cell and told him that Nurse 
David Rhodes would not come to see him because two nurses 
had already examined him, and he was on sick-call for the 
following day. Left in excruciating pain, Pearson screamed 
for several hours until the officer called medical again. This 
time, Nurse Rhodes came to his cell with a wheelchair—but  
Nurse Rhodes was upset, Pearson alleges, and told him that 
he would not be taken to medical unless he placed himself in 
the wheelchair. Unable to walk and in pain, Pearson claims 
that he was forced to crawl across the floor to the wheelchair.   
Nurse Rhodes took Pearson to the infirmary and 
examined him. He checked his vitals and recognized that 
Pearson had possible signs of appendicitis. Because 
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abdominal pain has many causes and Pearson was scheduled 
for a doctor’s examination in the morning, Nurse Rhodes 
thought a period of watchful waiting would be prudent and 
placed Pearson inside an infirmary cell for observation. At 
this time, Nurse Rhodes put an order on Pearson’s chart for 
“nothing by mouth” as a precaution in case he needed surgery 
but did not elevate Pearson’s condition to another medical 
official. J.A. 124, 288-91. Continuing to suffer in pain, 
Pearson screamed throughout the night.  
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 11, Pearson was 
seen by Dr. Ghatge, who ordered him sent to Somerset 
Hospital for evaluation. Later that day, Pearson was 
diagnosed with appendicitis and a surgeon removed Pearson’s 
inflamed appendix, as well as a gangrenous part of his 
omentum.  
 Events Prior to Surgery for Urethral Tear 
On April 14, 2007, Pearson returned to the prison with 
an order from his attending surgeon that he be scheduled for a 
follow-up examination in one week. He was examined by a 
prison nurse and prescribed Motrin, physical therapy, and a 
follow-up with a physician’s assistant before being sent back 
to his cell. J.A. 115, 132, 377.  
On April 15, Pearson began experiencing sharp pains 
and felt liquid running down his leg, which he later identified 
as blood flowing from his penis. He requested to be seen by 
medical. According to Pearson, the correctional officer called 
medical, but Nurse Kline instructed the officer that bleeding 
was normal after surgery and that Pearson should just lie 
down on his bunk. She did not examine him. 
At this point, Pearson claims that he continued to bleed 
in constant pain until the block officer witnessed it and sent 
him directly to the medical unit. At medical, Pearson 
maintains, Nurse Magyar had him undress in case he needed 
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to go to the hospital and called Dr. McGrath, who was angry 
at being called at home. During that call, Dr. McGrath 
ordered antibiotics as well as an increased intake of fluids. 
J.A. 115-16, 377. He also instructed the nurse to place 
Pearson in the infirmary for over-night observation.  
Dr. McGrath examined Pearson at 6:45 a.m. the 
following morning, diagnosed the bleeding as a normal 
consequence of the recent surgery, and sent him back to his 
cell. During the examination, Dr. McGrath collected lab 
work, ordered antibiotics, and scheduled a follow-up 
appointment. J.A. 116-17, 377-78. Later that night, Pearson 
began bleeding again and collected a quarter of a cup of blood 
in a glove to show the extent of it. He then complained about 
the bleeding to Sergeant Rittenour. According to Pearson, 
Rittenour relayed his complaint to Captain Thomas Papuga, 
who ordered Rittenour to discard the blood Pearson collected 
in the glove.  But Papuga knew that Pearson was receiving 
medical care—one of the cell block officers contacted 
medical and relayed to Captain Papuga that Pearson was 
unsatisfied with their response. J.A. 324, 385.  
At 7:00 a.m. on April 17, Pearson began bleeding 
again. He returned to medical where Dr. McGrath observed 
the bleeding and transferred him to the emergency department 
at Somerset Hospital. At the hospital, it was determined that 
Pearson was suffering from a urethral tear caused during his 
prior surgery. Pearson underwent a second surgery to 
cauterize the tear and was returned to SCI-Somerset the same 
day. 
B 
In 2009, Pearson filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging that twenty-eight defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the District Court 
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dismissed Pearson’s complaint for failure to state a claim, 
and, on October 16, 2009, we vacated that dismissal, holding 
that several of Pearson’s allegations stated a claim for 
deliberate indifference, including his allegations against 
Nurse Thomas, Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes, and Dr. 
McGrath. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 348 F. App’x 722, 
725-26 (3d Cir. 2009). At the time, we left open whether the 
other defendants might be able to raise grounds for dismissal 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 725. 
And we ordered the District Court to allow Pearson to amend 
his complaint before dismissing it. Id. at 726. 
On remand, Pearson filed an amended complaint, and 
in 2011, the District Court dismissed the claims against all the 
defendants except Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes, Captain 
Papuga, and Dr. McGrath for failure to state a claim. Nine 
months later, the District Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of Dr. McGrath and dismissed Pearson’s actions against 
Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes, and Captain Papuga as a sanction 
for failure to prosecute. Pearson appealed and this Court 
vacated the dismissal against Nurse Thomas, Nurse Kline, 
Nurse Rhodes, and Captain Papuga as well as the summary 
judgment order in favor of Dr. McGrath. Pearson v. Prison 
Health Serv., 519 F. App’x 79, 82-84 (3d Cir. 2013). Once 
again, we remanded this case to the District Court. 
During the second remand, counsel was appointed for 
Pearson,1 who requested funds for the retention of a qualified 
medical expert to develop malpractice and informed-consent 
claims against Somerset Hospital and his appendicitis 
surgeon, Dr. Pradham. Those requests were denied, and, in 
                                              
1 Counsel for Pearson is appearing pro bono.  We 
express our gratitude to counsel for accepting this matter and 
for the quality of his representation.   
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2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and 
recommendation advising that summary judgment be entered 
for the five remaining defendants in this case. The District 
Court adopted the report and recommendation and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the appellees. This timely 
appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order 
granting summary judgment, applying the same standard as 
the district court. Interstate Outdoor Advert., L.P. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 706 F.3d 527, 529-30 (3d Cir. 
2013). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party must demonstrate that “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To assess 
whether the moving party has satisfied this standard, we do 
not engage in credibility determinations, Simpson v. Kay 
Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1998), and we view the facts and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Scott 
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Material facts are those 
“that could affect the outcome” of the proceeding, and “a 
dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is 
sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 
the non-moving party.” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 
181 (3d Cir. 2011).  
III 
The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 
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509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). Accordingly, in Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prison 
officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act 
deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs 
by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care 
or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-
05. In order to sustain this constitutional claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,2 a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective 
showing that “the defendants were deliberately indifferent to 
[his or her] medical needs” and (2) an objective showing that 
“those needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 
197 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 
F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).  
In this case, the parties agree that Pearson’s 
appendicitis and urethral tear both constitute serious medical 
needs, and, as we noted the first time this case was appealed, 
we think it beyond question that both medical issues were 
serious. See Pearson, 348 F. App’x at 724; see also Atkinson 
v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]his Court 
has defined a medical need as serious if it has been diagnosed 
by a physician as requiring treatment”); Sherrod v. 
Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming that “an 
appendix on the verge of rupturing” is a serious medical 
need). Thus, the only question on appeal is whether Pearson 
                                              
2 While Pearson brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, the substantive right at issue nonetheless derives from 
the Eighth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has remarked, 
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a 
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by 
those parts of the United States Constitution . . . that it 
describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 
(1979).  
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has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could find that the defendants were deliberately 
indifferent.  
In its decision below, the District Court granted 
summary judgment on all of Pearson’s Eighth Amendment 
claims. It found that expert testimony was “necessary” for a 
reasonable jury to find that the defendants acted with 
deliberate indifference because Pearson’s “entire claim rests 
on the assertions that his care was inadequate.” J.A. 11. On 
appeal, Pearson argues that the record is sufficient without 
expert testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Nurse Thomas, Nurse Rhodes, Nurse Kline, 
Captain Papuga, and Dr. McGrath were deliberately 
indifferent. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with the 
District Court’s conclusion that expert testimony was 
necessary in this case. And, because the record is sufficient 
for a reasonable jury to find that Nurse Rhodes acted with 
deliberate indifference to Pearson’s serious medical needs, we 
will reverse the District Court’s order, in part, insofar as it 
grants summary judgment in favor of Nurse Rhodes.  
A 
To assess whether summary judgment was appropriate, 
we must first consider whether the District Court properly 
held that expert testimony was necessary in this case. If that 
legal conclusion is correct, we can affirm the District Court’s 
decision without further analysis. If not, we must also 
consider whether Pearson has offered sufficient evidence for 
a reasonable jury to find in his favor.  
At the outset, we note that in our most recent opinion 
in this case, we observed that it is “not clear that an expert 
opinion is necessary.” Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 82. We also 
note that our prior consideration of when expert testimony is 
required in a deliberate indifference case has only addressed 
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when expert testimony is necessary to create a genuine 
dispute that the prisoner’s medical needs are serious. In 
Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1987), we held 
that a district court may properly require expert medical 
opinions when, “[a]s laymen, the jury would not be in a 
position to decide whether any of the conditions described by 
plaintiffs could be classified as ‘serious.’” Id. at 473. In 
Brighthwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2011), we 
reiterated our holding in Boring, clarifying that expert 
testimony “is not necessarily required to establish the 
existence of a serious medical need” and that “[o]ther forms 
of extrinsic proof . . . may suffice in some cases.” Id. at 194 
n.8.  
Because the parties agree that Pearson’s medical need 
was serious, this appeal requires us to resolve an issue of first 
impression in this Circuit. We must decide for the first time 
whether and when medical expert testimony may be 
necessary to create a triable issue on the subjective prong of a 
deliberate indifference case. In answering this question, three 
principles guide our analysis. The first is that deliberate 
indifference is a subjective state of mind that can, like any 
other form of scienter, be proven through circumstantial 
evidence and witness testimony. See, e.g., Durmer v. 
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that, when 
“intent becomes critical,” it is “important that the trier of fact 
hear” the defendant’s “testimony in order to assess his 
credibility”); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1372 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (“[P]laintiffs necessarily must use circumstantial 
evidence to establish subjective mental intent.”); In re 
Kauffman, 675 F.2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Intent . . . 
must be gleaned from inferences drawn from a course of 
conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The second principle is that there is a critical 
distinction “between cases where the complaint alleges a 
complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate 
medical treatment.” United States ex. rel. Walker v. Fayette 
Cty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979). Because “mere 
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not 
“support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,” 
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. 
Cir. 1987), when medical care is provided, we presume that 
the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it 
violates professional standards of care. See Brown v. Borough 
of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is 
well established that as long as a physician exercises 
professional judgment his behavior will not violate a 
prisoner’s constitutional rights”).  
The third and final principle is that the mere receipt of 
inadequate medical care does not itself amount to deliberate 
indifference—the defendant must also act with the requisite 
state of mind when providing that inadequate care. Durmer, 
991 F.2d at 69 n.13 (noting a plaintiff can only proceed to 
trial when there is a genuine issue of fact regarding both the 
adequacy of medical care and the defendant’s intent). This 
observation is critical because it makes clear that there are 
two very distinct subcomponents to the deliberate 
indifference prong of an adequacy of care claim. The first is 
the adequacy of the medical care—an objective inquiry where 
expert testimony could be helpful to the jury. The second is 
the individual defendant’s state of mind—a subjective inquiry 
that can be proven circumstantially without expert testimony.  
Based upon these observations, we think that medical 
expert testimony may be necessary to establish deliberate 
indifference in an adequacy of care claim where, as laymen, 
the jury would not be in a position to determine that the 
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particular treatment or diagnosis fell below a professional 
standard of care. As is the case with evaluating whether the 
prisoner is suffering from a serious medical need, evaluating 
whether medical treatment is adequate presents an objective 
question typically beyond the competence of a non-medical 
professional. Likewise, it makes sense to require a prisoner to 
offer extrinsic proof regarding the quality of medical care in 
adequacy of care cases when, to defeat our presumption that 
the medical care provided to him or her was adequate, the 
prisoner must show that the medical official did not exercise 
professional judgment. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (holding that when the burden of 
persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, 
“the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 
56” by demonstrating that “the nonmoving party’s evidence is 
insufficient to establish an essential element of [its] claim”); 
Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (“[P]rison authorities are accorded 
considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of 
prisoners.”); Brown, 903 F.2d at 278 (“[A]s long as a 
physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will 
not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).  
Nonetheless, for two reasons, we disagree with the 
District Court’s conclusion that medical expert testimony was 
necessary in this case. First, we believe that conclusion 
ignores our decision in Brightwell, where we noted that 
expert testimony “is not necessarily required” where other 
forms of extrinsic proof may suffice. 637 F.3d at 194 n.8. In 
this case, Pearson has not offered any extrinsic proof 
regarding the quality of his medical care, and, it may well be 
possible that other forms of extrinsic proof (e.g., a training 
manual, photograph, or medical records) could have 
permitted a reasonable jury to find that his medical care was 
inadequate. Accordingly, to the extent we agree with the 
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District Court that a reasonable jury could not find in 
Pearson’s favor on this record, we believe that it is additional 
extrinsic proof, rather than an expert witness specifically, that 
was required for him to survive summary judgment. 
Second, we disagree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that additional proof was needed to create a triable 
issue on all, rather than just some, of Pearson’s deliberate 
indifference claims. Certainly, for the reasons just stated, 
extrinsic evidence is needed to create a triable issue on 
Pearson’s adequacy of treatment claims where it would not be 
obvious to a layperson that the defendant breached a 
professional standard of care. However, Pearson also raises 
two claims that he was delayed or denied treatment outright 
for a non-medical reason and one adequacy of treatment 
claim where it would be apparent to a layperson that his 
medical treatment violated a professional standard of care. 
For these claims, additional extrinsic proof was not necessary 
to survive summary judgment, and we hold that the District 
Court erred in concluding otherwise.  
For Pearson’s claim that Nurse Rhodes forced him to 
crawl to a wheelchair, we believe that Pearson’s sworn 
testimony is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that 
Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate disregard to his medical 
needs. See Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 661 (3d Cir. 
1986) (noting that in “the absence of any contrary medical 
evidence, plaintiff’s sworn testimony must be taken as true 
for purposes of creating a fact issue.”). As noted above, our 
precedent provides that a plaintiff can proceed to trial on an 
adequacy of care claim when there is a genuine issue of fact 
regarding both the adequacy of care and the defendant’s 
intent. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 n.13. And we do not think 
additional extrinsic proof is necessary for Pearson to create a 
genuine dispute of fact on either issue for this claim. A 
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layperson is capable of concluding that forcing a screaming 
patient to crawl to a wheelchair violates professional 
standards of care.3 And a reasonable jury could find that 
Nurse Rhodes knew Pearson could not walk and deliberately 
failed to assist him for non-medical reasons.  
For Pearson’s claims that he was delayed or denied 
medical treatment for a non-medical reason, we also believe 
that requiring additional extrinsic proof would be 
inappropriate given the subjective nature of scienter and our 
case law on deliberate indifference. Again, a delay or denial 
of medical treatment claim must be approached differently 
than an adequacy of care claim. Fayette Cty., 599 F.2d at 575 
n.2. Unlike the deliberate indifference prong of an adequacy 
of care claim (which involves both an objective and 
subjective inquiry), the deliberate indifference prong of a 
delay or denial of medical treatment claim involves only one 
subjective inquiry—since there is no presumption that the 
defendant acted properly, it lacks the objective, propriety of 
medical treatment, prong of an adequacy of care claim. 
                                              
3 Indeed, expert testimony is not admissible, let alone 
required to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
care the prisoner received was adequate, if it was obvious to 
the jury that the care violated professional standards. See, 
e.g., Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 
320-21 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that Rule 702 requires expert 
testimony to “assist the trier of fact” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 
1972 proposed rules (noting that expert testimony is not 
helpful “when the untrained layman would be qualified to 
determine . . . the particular issue without enlightenment from 
those having a specialized understanding of the subject 
involved in the dispute”). 
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Absent that objective inquiry, extrinsic proof is not necessary 
for the jury to find deliberate indifference in a delay or denial 
of medical treatment claim. All that is needed is for the 
surrounding circumstances to be sufficient to permit a 
reasonable jury to find that the delay or denial was motivated 
by non-medical factors. See, e.g., Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68-69; 
United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1945) 
(“[I]t is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to 
each piece of evidence . . . particularly where the question 
at issue is the credibility of the witness.”). The District Court 
erred in holding otherwise. 
In sum, because it is just as difficult for a layperson to 
assess the adequacy of medical care as it is for them to assess 
the seriousness of a medical condition, we hold that medical 
expert testimony may be necessary in some adequacy of care 
cases when the propriety of a particular diagnosis or course of 
treatment would not be apparent to a layperson. Nonetheless, 
we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that expert 
testimony was necessary in this case because we are not 
satisfied that medical expert testimony would be necessary 
for all of Pearson’s claims, nor are we satisfied that other 
forms of extrinsic proof would not have sufficed. 
B 
Because the District Court incorrectly held that expert 
testimony was necessary for Pearson to survive summary 
judgment, we must now consider whether the record in this 
case was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Nurse Thomas, Nurse Rhodes, Nurse Kline, 
Captain Papuga, and Dr. McGrath were deliberately 
indifferent to Pearson’s serious medical needs. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “deliberate indifference entails 
something more than mere negligence” and is a subjective 
standard that requires the official to both “be aware of facts 
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from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 
risk of serious harm exists” and to “also draw the inference.” 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994). In prior 
cases, we have found deliberate indifference in a variety of 
contexts including where (1) prison authorities deny 
reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2) knowledge of 
the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional 
refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical treatment is 
delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4) prison authorities 
prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for 
serious medical needs. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347. Because 
each defendant played a different role in regard to Pearson’s 
treatment at SCI Somerset, we will address Pearson’s claims 
against each of them in turn.  
1. Claims Against Nurse Thomas 
Pearson first claims that the District Court erred when 
granting summary judgment to Nurse Thomas. He argues that 
a reasonably jury could find that she acted with deliberate 
indifference because she did not raise his abdominal pain with 
other staff and offered no medical assistance other than to 
place him on sick call.  
We disagree. First, even if a reasonable jury could find 
that Nurse Thomas was negligent in diagnosing or treating his 
pain, that would not be enough for the jury to find that Nurse 
Thomas acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has held, “a 
complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing 
or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 
429 U.S. at 106; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“Allegations of medical malpractice are not 
sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation.”).  
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Second, while Pearson claims that Nurse Thomas 
delayed or denied him medical care, it is undisputed that she 
examined him, diagnosed him with a pulled muscle, and 
decided not to elevate his condition based on her opinion that 
it was not severe. Thus, his claim against her is one that she 
inadequately diagnosed and treated his medical condition. As 
we remarked earlier, that distinction is critical—because the 
deliberate indifference standard “affords considerable latitude 
to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of 
the medical problems of inmate patients,” we must “disavow 
any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of 
[their] particular course of treatment” so long as it “remains a 
question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of 
Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 
1979) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown, 
903 F.2d at 278 (“[I]t is well established that as long as a 
physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will 
not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”); Fayette 
Cty., 599 F.2d at 575 n.2 (“[F]ederal courts are generally 
reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to 
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
Here, Pearson has offered no circumstantial evidence 
suggesting that Nurse Thomas subjectively appreciated the 
true seriousness of the risk of harm. Nor did he produce 
extrinsic evidence suggesting that Nurse Thomas’s treatment 
decision regarding the symptoms of which she had awareness 
was “a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice, or standards” such that a reasonable jury 
could conclude that she “actually did not base [her] decision 
on such judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 
(1982). Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that she 
acted with the “obduracy and wantonness” that violates the 
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Eighth Amendment, and we agree with the District Court that 
Nurse Thomas is entitled to summary judgment. Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“It is obduracy and 
wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that 
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause . . . .”). 
2. Claims Against Nurse Kline 
For similar reasons, we also agree with the District 
Court that Nurse Kline is entitled to summary judgment. 
Although Pearson argues that a reasonable jury could find 
that she was deliberately indifferent to his appendicitis when 
she told him that his gallbladder was failing but merely 
offered him Tylenol and Maalox, we disagree. Without 
extrinsic evidence showing that a failing gall bladder is 
emergent or necessitates some other response, no layperson 
would be able to find that Nurse Kline’s determination that 
Pearson should rest until his examination in the morning was 
“a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice, or standards.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. Hence no 
reasonable jury could find that this response violated the 
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown, 903 F.2d at 278 (“[I]t is 
well established that as long as a physician exercises 
professional judgment his behavior will not violate a 
prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).  
Likewise, while Pearson maintains that a reasonable 
jury could find that Nurse Kline acted with deliberate 
indifference to his urethral tear when she initially declined to 
examine his bleeding on April 15 and then noted a “copious” 
amount of blood, J.A. 126, in his underwear without 
escalating his situation, we believe that the record fails to 
create a triable issue as to whether Nurse Kline acted with 
deliberate indifference. Whether or not Nurse Kline escalated 
Pearson’s condition, it is clear that his condition was elevated 
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to Dr. McGrath once Pearson was taken to the infirmary. 
Nurse Kline cannot be held liable for allowing a different 
nurse to escalate Pearson’s condition, nor can she be held 
liable for following Dr. McGrath’s orders that Pearson remain 
in the infirmary overnight. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 
(noting non-physicians cannot “be considered deliberately 
indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to 
the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being 
treated by the prison doctor”).  
Finally, even if Nurse Kline refused to examine 
Pearson when the correctional officer first called about his 
bleeding, the circumstances surrounding this refusal are not 
sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether she violated 
the Eighth Amendment. While Pearson points to evidence 
that Nurse Kline delayed her examination because she 
believed that his bleeding was normal after surgery, this 
serves only to reinforce that she failed to immediately 
appreciate the severity of his medical needs. Absent evidence 
that the seriousness of his bleeding was communicated to her 
at that time, a reasonable jury could not conclude she was 
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 
a substantial risk of serious harm existe[d]” and that she “also 
dr[ew] the inference.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And that 
is only particularly so here—given this lack of 
communication regarding the seriousness of the bleeding, and 
given that Pearson was under the care of Dr. McGrath, who 
had prescribed medicine and physical therapy upon Pearson’s 
return from his appendectomy, Nurse Kline was justified in 
believing that Pearson was not in danger absent instructions 
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from Dr. McGrath or Pearson’s surgeon that bleeding should 
be treated as more than a normal consequence of his surgery.4    
3. Claims Against Nurse Rhodes 
Pearson next argues that a reasonable jury could find 
that Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate indifference to his 
medical needs because Nurse Rhodes (1) refused to examine 
him in his cell when the block officer first called medical, (2) 
forced him to crawl to the wheelchair to obtain medical 
treatment, and (3) did nothing but order him placed in the 
infirmary overnight despite recognizing signs of appendicitis. 
We agree with Pearson that these claims create a triable issue 
as to whether Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate indifference 
to his needs. We will therefore reverse the order of the 
District Court, in part, insofar as it grants summary judgment 
in favor of Nurse Rhodes. 
                                              
4 In Spruill, we specifically indicated that a non-
medical prison official will not be chargeable with deliberate 
indifference, “absent a reason to believe (or actual 
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are 
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” 372 F.3d at 236. 
Now confronted with a set of defendants who are not 
physicians but have some amount of medical training, we 
clarify that the same division of labor concerns that underlie 
that rule apply when a nurse knows that a prisoner is under a 
physician’s care and has no reason to believe that the doctor 
is mistreating the prisoner. Given that it is the physician with 
the ultimate authority to diagnose and prescribe treatment for 
the prisoner, a nurse who knows that the prisoner is under a 
physician’s care is certainly “justified in believing that the 
prisoner is in capable hands,” id., so long as the nurse has no 
discernable basis to question the physician’s medical 
judgment.  
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Pearson’s claim that Nurse Rhodes failed to examine 
him when he initially requested medical assistance creates a 
triable issue as to whether Nurse Rhodes was deliberately 
indifferent because it raises a claim that Pearson was either 
denied reasonable requests for medical treatment, or 
necessary medical treatment was delayed for non-medical 
reasons. Unlike Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes cannot claim that 
Pearson was already being treated by a physician. In addition, 
when Rhodes initially denied medical care, he was confronted 
with a report from a corrections officer that an inmate was 
suffering from excruciating pain—an inmate who had twice 
sought medical assistance earlier in the day, reporting the 
same complaint but with increasing severity. 
As Farmer noted, an official may not escape liability by 
“merely refus[ing] to verify underlying facts that he strongly 
suspect[s] to be true, or declin[ing] to confirm strong 
inferences of risk that he strongly suspect[s] to 
exist.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. Neither is he immunized 
from liability merely because he delays care for an emergent 
condition in reliance on a sick call policy.  See Natale v. 
Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 
2003). Because these circumstances may suggest that Nurse 
Rhodes engaged in a pattern of deliberately indifferent 
conduct in spite of evidence that he was aware that Pearson 
faced a substantial risk of harm, there is a genuine issue of 
fact as to why Nurse Rhodes refused to examine Pearson and 
“we cannot conclude as a matter of law [his] conduct did not 
run afoul of the [Eighth Amendment].” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 
68.  
Likewise, Pearson’s claim that he was forced to crawl 
to the wheelchair creates a genuine dispute as to whether 
Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate indifference. Viewing the 
record in Pearson’s favor, as we must, Nurse Rhodes forced a 
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patient, who had been screaming in pain for several hours, to 
crawl to a wheelchair despite indicating that he was unable to 
walk. We do not believe that additional evidence is required 
for a reasonable jury to conclude that this conduct violates a 
professional standard of care or that such conduct entails the 
obduracy and wantonness that is proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 
1068 (8th Cir. 1980) (reversing grant of summary judgment 
where the plaintiff claimed that defendants refused to give 
him a wheelchair, forcing him to crawl on the floor). 5 
Finally, Pearson’s claim that Nurse Rhodes merely 
ordered observation despite recognizing signs of appendicitis 
creates a triable issue as to whether Nurse Rhodes acted with 
deliberate indifference. On its own, this claim might not be 
sufficient to survive summary judgment—because Nurse 
Rhodes examined and diagnosed Pearson in the infirmary, we 
would be confronted with an adequacy of treatment claim that 
lacks extrinsic evidence showing that Nurse Rhodes’ response 
“so deviated from professional standards of care that it 
                                              
5 Rhodes correctly points out that Pearson’s only 
evidence of this event is his own testimony. However, 
counsel for Rhodes conceded at argument that we would be 
compelled to reverse and remand this issue for trial if it did, 
in fact, occur as Pearson describes.  See Oral Argument at 
42:38–44:47. We, of course, must credit Pearson’s testimony. 
While we require more than conclusory affidavits to create a 
genuine issue of material fact, MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 485 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013), when 
deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence of 
the non-movant is to be believed,” and credibility 
determinations must be left to the jury.  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
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amounted to deliberate indifference.” Allard v. Baldwin, 779 
F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But that examination did not occur until after Nurse 
Rhodes refused to treat Pearson and allegedly forced him 
crawl to a wheelchair. This pattern of disinterested conduct 
“separates this complaint from ordinary allegations of 
medical malpractice.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 
(3d Cir. 1990). Indeed, while “one reasonable reading of the 
record in this case” is that Nurse Rhodes ordered observation 
in the infirmary based on his informed medical judgment, 
“we cannot conclude that it is the only one” because, insofar 
as the record suggests that Nurse Rhodes repeatedly ignored 
Pearson’s requests for treatment based on non-medical 
reasons, a reasonable jury could find that Nurse Rhodes also 
had a non-medical motive for leaving Pearson in the 
infirmary overnight. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67. Accordingly, 
because Nurse Rhodes suspected appendicitis, a condition 
that would have put him on notice that a “substantial risk of 
serious harm exists,” we cannot conclude as a matter of law 
that this observation order did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.6 
                                              
6 Nurse Rhodes argued that he was entitled to qualified 
immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of 
these events that an official would be liable for a delay in care 
without expert medical evidence that the inmate suffered 
harm as a result. This fundamentally misunderstands the 
qualified immunity inquiry. Qualified immunity requires us to 
ask whether a reasonable official would have understood, at 
the time of the challenged conduct, that what he or she was 
doing violated an established right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 
U.S. 731, 741 (2011).That analysis cannot turn on facts that 
could not be known to an official at the time, like whether the 
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4. Claims Against Dr. McGrath 
Next, Pearson maintains that Dr. McGrath 
demonstrated a pattern of deliberate indifference to his 
medical needs through three incidents after he returned to the 
prison following his appendix surgery. The first is that Dr. 
McGrath ordered Pearson sent directly back to the general 
population without any observation period in the prison 
infirmary, and without ordering the follow-up prescribed by 
Pearson’s surgeon. The second is that Dr. McGrath was angry 
and simply ordered Pearson to be placed in the infirmary 
overnight when Nurse Magyar called him about Pearson’s 
bleeding on April 15. The third is that Dr. McGrath told 
Pearson his bleeding was normal and discharged him back to 
his cell after an examination on April 16. 
We agree with the District Court that Dr. McGrath is 
entitled to summary judgment. Whether or not Dr. McGrath 
was angry at being called at home on April 15, Pearson does 
not dispute that Dr. McGrath prescribed treatment over the 
phone, ordering observation in the infirmary, antibiotics, and 
                                                                                                     
plaintiff would ultimately be able to produce expert testimony 
that the delay resulted in harm. It was sufficiently clear at the 
time of these events that exposing an inmate to the kind of 
severe and protracted pain and mental anxiety alleged in this 
case could expose an official to Eighth Amendment 
liability.  See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346; White, 897 F.2d at 
111. 
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increased intake of fluids. J.A. 115-16, 377.7 Pearson also 
concedes that he was not in immediate danger at the time, and 
that Dr. McGrath examined him at 6:45 a.m. the following 
morning, diagnosing his bleeding as a normal consequence of 
the surgery in addition to collecting lab work and scheduling 
a follow-up appointment. J.A. 116-17, 377-78. Because 
medical treatment was provided on both occasions and 
Pearson has provided no extrinsic evidence that would permit 
a layperson to conclude that Dr. McGrath’s actions 
constituted “a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards,” a reasonable 
jury could not find that he was deliberately indifferent either 
occasion. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323; see also Pierce, 612 
F.2d at 754 (“Courts will disavow any attempt to second-
guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of 
treatment” so long as it “remains a question of sound 
professional judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Taking those claims away, the sole assertion that 
Pearson has against Dr. McGrath is that McGrath was 
deliberately indifferent for sending him back to the general 
prison population without any observation period in the 
prison infirmary and without ordering the lifting restrictions 
or follow-up appointment prescribed by Pearson’s surgeon. 
As with Pearson’s other claims against Dr. McGrath, the 
record is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that 
                                              
7 Pearson points to this call as circumstantial evidence 
of Dr. McGrath’s state of mind that reflects, in combination 
with evidence of the totality of his interactions with Dr. 
McGrath, deliberate indifference. While such circumstantial 
evidence may be relevant to the subjective inquiry, the 
evidence here is still not sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
conclude that he had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.  
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Dr. McGrath was deliberately indifferent to his medical 
needs. Since Dr. McGrath ordered pain medication, exercise 
to help with breathing, and a follow-up medical appointment 
upon Pearson’s return to the prison, any complaint that he 
should have ordered additional observation is no more than a 
“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” that 
does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.” 
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346; see J.A. 132. At the same time, 
while prison authorities may be held liable under the Eighth 
Amendment when they “prevent an inmate from receiving 
recommended treatment for serious medical needs,” we 
cannot find that this is such a case. Pierce, 612 F.2d at 762. 
Unlike in our prior interference-with-prescribed treatment 
cases, there is nothing in the record indicating that Dr. 
McGrath refused to allow Pearson to receive the prescribed 
treatment, let alone that Dr. McGrath knew that the lifting 
restriction or the follow-up appointment had been prescribed.8 
Absent such evidence, this claim is merely that Dr. McGrath 
negligently failed to order the prescribed treatment, and, 
because deliberate indifference “entails something more than 
mere negligence,” no reasonable jury could find him liable 
for this conduct under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 835. 
5. Claims Against Captain Papuga 
Finally, we agree with the District Court that Captain 
Papuga is entitled to summary judgment. As our precedent 
makes clear, “a non-medical prison official” cannot “be 
charge[d] with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement 
of deliberate indifference” when the “prisoner is under the 
                                              
8 In fact, as the follow-up appointment was scheduled 
to take place after the second surgery, it is not the case that 
the prison ever violated the surgeon’s orders. 
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care of medical experts” and the official does not have “a 
reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or 
their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” 
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see also Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 
(holding that non-physicians cannot “be considered 
deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond 
directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was 
already being treated by the prison doctor”). Whether or not 
Captain Papuga ordered Sergeant Rittenour to discard 
Pearson’s blood, Pearson was being treated by medical, and 
Captain Papuga was only made aware of Pearson’s bleeding 
after the cell block officers contacted medical regarding his 
condition. J.A. 324, 385. Accordingly, since Pearson has 
identified no reason for Captain Papuga to believe that he was 
being mistreated, no reasonable jury could conclude that 
Captain Papuga was deliberately indifferent for failing to 
second-guess the medical staff’s appraisal of the situation.  
IV 
Regretfully, we must comment on one final issue that 
has percolated over the course of this litigation. During his 
prior appeal in 2013, Pearson argued that the Magistrate 
Judge and District Judge should recuse themselves because 
they were biased against him. At the time, we were satisfied 
that neither judge would harbor bias on remand, but we did 
express concern with their editorializing on prisoner litigation 
when dismissing Pearson’s complaint. Specifically, the 
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation “criticized 
inmate medical claims in general” and made general 
observations regarding frivolous litigation filed by prisoners 
that had “no apparent bearing on the merits of Pearson’s 
claims.” Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 84.9 
                                              
9 The precise language we admonished was:  
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When we remanded this case, we were hopeful that the 
Magistrate Judge and District Judge would cease making 
these kinds of irrelevant, categorical statements for several 
reasons, including that they are unnecessary and might cast 
our judicial system in a bad light by leading an observer to 
question the impartiality of these proceedings. In addition, it 
is antithetical to the fair administration of justice to pre-judge 
an entire class of litigants, and we expect courts to conduct, at 
a minimum, a careful assessment of the claims of each party. 
By failing to exhibit such an individualized inquiry, these 
statements disserved the important principle that “justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 11, 13 (1954). 
Despite our optimism, and despite our admonishment 
of these sorts of categorical statements, this commentary 
                                                                                                     
 
Inmate complaints often result in the naming of 
as many defendants as the inmate can remember 
. . . even though there is no legal claim against 
them in the complaint, no viable legal claim 
within any likely amendment to the complaint, 
and no interest on the part of the inmate in 
following through. They generate large 
litigation expenses which divert resources even 
from the medical care provided to inmates not 
to mention other uses the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania and its taxpayers might have for 
the money. This case is a textbook example. 
 
Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Pearson v. Prison Health Service, No. 09-97, 2011 WL 
4473462, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2011)). 
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continued since we last remanded this case to the District 
Court. While Pearson has not renewed his motion for recusal 
either in the District Court or on appeal, we note that in one 
prior opinion, the District Court adopted a report and 
recommendation in which the Magistrate Judge stated:  “To 
repeat what I have said before, what is even more perverse is 
that [appointing an expert in prisoner litigation] would be a 
benefit only available to the class of litigants that has 
uniquely demonstrated to Congress that it files an undue 
amount of frivolous and meritless lawsuits.” Pearson v. 
Prison Health Serv., No. 09-97, 2014 WL 2860660, at *4 
(W.D. Pa. June 23, 2014). Likewise, in the report and 
recommendation adopted by the District Court in granting 
summary judgment to the appellees, the Magistrate Judge 
made several statements regarding prisoners such as noting 
that “anyone reading the news is familiar with inmates using 
bodily fluids, especially blood, as weapons.” J.A. 459.10 
                                              
10 “Although a magistrate is not an Article III judge, … 
a district court may refer dispositive motions to a magistrate 
for a recommendation so long as ‘the entire process takes 
place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction,’ 
and the judge ‘exercise[s] the ultimate authority to issue an 
appropriate order.’” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985) 
(citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The 
District Court is thus ultimately responsible for the decision, 
including for the Magistrate’s report and recommendation if it 
is adopted in its entirety, but magistrate judges play an 
important role in the operation of the federal courts and must 
take care to word their published recommendations 
accordingly. Indeed, it is equally applicable to District Judges 
and Magistrates that “[w]henever a judge’s impartiality 
‘might reasonably be questioned’ in a proceeding, 28 U.S.C. 
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As we noted in Pearson’s prior appeal and will 
reiterate now, Pearson suffered from two serious medical 
conditions, and “it does not appear . . . that he filed this 
lawsuit for recreational purposes or to harass prison 
personnel.” Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 84. It appears he filed 
this suit because he genuinely believes that the prison 
officials acted deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in 
violation of his constitutional rights. Whether or not he 
ultimately prevails, equality before the law is one of the 
founding principles of our government and Pearson deserves 
to have his case treated as carefully and thoughtfully as any 
other litigant’s.  
While we remain convinced that the Magistrate Judge 
and District Judge are capable of handling Pearson’s trial 
without any bias, we trust that our message will be heard on 
this third remand and that this editorializing will cease going 
forward. 
V 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court as to Nurse Thomas, Nurse 
Kline, Captain Papuga, and Dr. McGrath, reverse as to Nurse 
Rhodes, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
§ 455(a) commands the judge to disqualify himself sua sponte 
in that proceeding.”  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 
10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1993).   
